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Note to readers 
 
This Guide is part of the series of Case-Law Guides published by the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereafter “the Court”, “the European Court” or “the Strasbourg Court”) to inform legal practitioners 
about the fundamental judgments delivered by the Strasbourg Court. This particular Guide analyses 
and sums up the case-law under Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter 
“the Convention” or “the European Convention”) until 31 March 2018. Readers will find the key 
principles in this area and the relevant precedents. 
The case-law cited has been selected among the leading, major, and/or recent judgments and 
decisions.* 
The Court’s judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more generally, to 
elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the 
observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties (Ireland 
v. the United Kingdom, § 154; and, more recently, Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], § 109). 
The mission of the system set up by the Convention is thus to determine issues of public policy in the 
general interest, thereby raising the standards of protection of human rights and extending human 
rights jurisprudence throughout the community of the Convention States (Konstantin Markin 
v. Russia [GC], § 89, no. 30078/06, ECHR 2012). Indeed, the Court has emphasised the Convention’s 
role as a “constitutional instrument of European public order” in the field of human rights 
(Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 156, ECHR 
2005-VI). 
This Guide contains references to keywords for each cited Article of the Convention and Additional 
Protocols. The legal issues dealt with in each case are summarised in a List of keywords, chosen from 
a thesaurus of terms taken (in most cases) directly from the text of the Convention and its Protocols. 
The HUDOC database of the Court’s case-law enables searches to be made by keyword. Searching 
with these keywords enables a group of documents with similar legal content to be found (the 
Court’s reasoning and conclusions in each case are summarised through the keywords). Keywords 
for individual cases can be found by clicking on the Case Details tag in HUDOC. For further 
information about the HUDOC database and the keywords, please see the HUDOC user manual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
*  The case-law cited may be in either or both of the official languages (English and French) of the Court and the European 
Commission of Human Rights (hereafter “the Commission”). Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to a judgment 
on the merits delivered by a Chamber of the Court. The abbreviation “(dec.)” indicates that the citation is of a decision of 
the Court and “[GC]” that the case was heard by the Grand Chamber. Chamber judgments that were not final when this 
update was published are marked with an asterisk (*). 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Article 18 of the Convention– Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be 
applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.” 
HUDOC keywords 
Restrictions for unauthorised purposes (18) 
 
1.  The object and purpose of Article 18 of the Convention are to prohibit the misuse of power 
(Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 303 and 306). According to the Travaux préparatoires of the 
Convention, it presents an “application of the theory of misapplication of power” (CDH (75) 11, p. 8). 
It guards against State suppression of the Convention rights and freedoms “by means of minor 
measures which, while made with the pretext of organising the exercise of these freedoms on its 
territory, or of safeguarding the letter of the law, have the opposite effect” (ibid., p. 6).  
2.  Article 18 complements the clauses which provide for restrictions of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention. Its wording “shall not be applied for any purpose other than” matches 
closely the wording of those clauses, for example, the second sentence of Article 5 § 1 and the 
second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 287 and 293). Article 18 does 
not, however, serve merely to clarify the scope of the restriction clauses. It also expressly prohibits 
the High Contracting Parties from restricting the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention 
for purposes not prescribed by the Convention itself, and to this extent it is autonomous (ibid., 
§ 288). 
3.  Parallel to its autonomous function, Article 18 has been used by the Court as an aid to 
interpretation of the restriction clauses contained in other provisions of the Convention or its 
Protocols (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 269): 
 Article 5 § 1 of the Convention: Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, § 39; Guzzardi v. Italy, 
§ 102; Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, § 44; Weeks v. the United Kingdom, § 42; 
Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], § 117; Kucheruk v. Ukraine, § 177; 
 Article 8 § 2 of the Convention: De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, § 93; Gillow v. the 
United Kingdom, § 54;  
 Article 10 § 2 of the Convention: Lingens v. Austria, § 36; 
 Article 11 § 2 of the Convention: The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and 
Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), § 83; 
 Article 15 of the Convention: Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), p. 59, § 38; 
 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Beyeler v. Italy [GC], § 111. 
4.  Article 18 is rarely invoked and there have been few cases where the Court declared a complaint 
under Article 18 admissible, let alone found a violation (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 898). 
A comprehensive survey of the Court’s case-law under Article 18 can be found in Merabishvili 
v. Georgia [GC], §§ 264-281. 
5.  In view of the scarcity of its case-law under Article 18, the Court exercises increased diligence 
when deciding cases where allegations of improper motives are made (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev 
v. Russia, § 898). 
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II.  Scope of application 
A.  The accessory nature of Article 18 
6.  In a similar way to Article 14, Article 18 of the Convention has no independent existence; it can 
only be applied in conjunction with an Article of the Convention or the Protocols thereto which sets 
out or qualifies the rights and freedoms that the High Contracting Parties have undertaken to secure 
to those under their jurisdiction (Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission’s report, p. 9; Gusinskiy 
v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, § 49; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, § 663; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 105; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 294; Ilgar 
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 153; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 113).  
7.  As with Article 14, there can be a breach of Article 18 even if there is no breach of the Article in 
conjunction with which it applies (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 288; see also Kamma v. the 
Netherlands, Commission’s report, p. 9; Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73; Cebotari v. Moldova, § 49).  
B.  Applicability of Article 18 
8.  For Article 18 to become applicable in conjunction with another substantive provision of the 
Convention or its Protocols, a restriction should be imposed on the right under the substantive 
provision (Josephides v. Turkey (dec.), § 4). 
9.  A violation of Article 18 can only arise where the right or freedom which has been interfered with 
is subject to restrictions permitted under the Convention (Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission’s 
report, p. 4; Oates v. Poland (dec.); Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 73); in other words when it is a qualified 
right (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 265 and 271).  
10.  A complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with an absolute right will therefore be 
incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae (Timurtaş v. Turkey, Commission’s report, 
§ 329). 
11.  The question whether Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention contain any express or implied 
restrictions which may form the subject of the Court’s examination under Article 18 of the 
Convention remains open (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), § 261; compare, for example, 
Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, § 129, where, in the circumstances relevant to that case, the Court 
rejected as incompatible ratione materiae a complaint under Article 18 read in conjunction with 
Articles 6 and 7 as these provisions did not contain any express or implied restrictions in so far as 
relevant to those cases (see also Navalnyye v. Russia, § 88); Nastase v. Romania (dec.), §§ 105-109, 
where it rejected as manifestly ill-founded a complaint under Article 18 read in conjunction with 
Article 6; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), § 16, and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), §§ 310-314, 
where it declared admissible the applicants’ complaints under Article 18 read in conjunction with 
Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 and subsequently, having examined the merits of those complaints in the 
judgment of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, §§ 897-909, found no violation of Article 18). 
C.  Examples of application of Article 18 in conjunction with other 
substantive provisions 
12.  The Court has examined complaints under Article 18 in conjunction with the provisions listed 
below: 
 Article 5 of the Convention: Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 78; Cebotari v. Moldova, § 53; 
Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 254; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 110; Dochnal v. Poland, § 114,; 
Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 301; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 144; Rasul Jafarov 
European Court of Human Rights  6/23 
Guide on Article 18 of the Convention – Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
v. Azerbaijan, § 163; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 110; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 318-
354; Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.);  
 Article 6 of the Convention: Nastase v. Romania (dec.), §§ 105-109; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia 
(no. 2) (dec.), § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), §§ 310-314; 
 Article 8 of the Convention: Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), § 73; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia (no. 2) 
(dec.), § 16; Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (dec.), §§ 310-314; 
 Article 9 of the Convention: C.R. v. Switzerland (dec.);  
 Article 10 of the Convention: Şener v. Turkey, §§ 59-62; 
 Article 11 of the Convention: Navalnyy v. Russia*, §§ 77-79; 
 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: Isik v. Turkey, decision Commission; OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, §§ 663-666; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), § 73. 
13.  The Court has thus far found a breach of Article 18 only in conjunction with Article 5 (Gusinskiy 
v. Russia; Cebotari v. Moldova; Lutsenko v. Ukraine; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine; Ilgar Mammadov 
v. Azerbaijan; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC]). 
D.  Allegations of ulterior purposes examined under other 
provisions of the Convention 
14.  Allegations of improper motives or ulterior purposes underlying restrictions of Convention rights 
are sometimes raised and examined under substantive provisions of the Convention. 
 Article 5 § 1: If there is some manifest irregularity which, seen in context, shows that a 
deprivation of liberty was chiefly meant for an ulterior purpose, the Court finds an absence 
of a legitimate ground for the deprivation of liberty and accordingly a breach of Article 5 
§ 1. Such was the case where: 
 the applicants were detained on vague or fabricated charges or their detention was 
extended in order to prevent or punish their participation in rallies (Shimovolos 
v. Russia, §§ 52-57; Hakobyan and Others v. Armenia, § 123; Nemtsov v. Russia, § 103; 
Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, §§ 107-108; Kasparov v. Russia, §§ 50-56; Huseynli 
and Others v. Azerbaijan, §§ 146-147; Ibrahimov and Others v. Azerbaijan, §§ 126-127; 
Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, §§ 92-95); 
 the authorities manipulated procedures to delay having to obtain judicial authorisation 
for the detention, as required under domestic law (Oleksiy Mykhaylovych Zakharkin 
v. Ukraine, §§ 86-88), or in order to proceed with a disguised extradition (Bozano 
v. France, §§ 59-60; Nowak v. Ukraine, § 58; Azimov v. Russia, §§ 163 and 165; 
Eshonkulov v. Russia, § 65); 
 the applicant was illegally abducted and surrendered to another State (Iskandarov 
v. Russia, §§ 109-115 and 148-151); 
 the authorities summoned asylum-seekers to complete their asylum request, thereby 
seeking to gain their trust with a view to arresting and subsequently deporting them 
(Čonka v. Belgium, § 41); 
 citizens of another State were indiscriminately arrested with a view to being deported 
en masse as a measure of reprisal (Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], §§ 185-186); 
 the applicant was arrested and detained with a view to acquiring leverage over the 
criminal proceedings against his brother (Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, § 57); 
 the applicant was apprehended as a witness – although the investigator’s real intent 
was to charge him as a defendant – in order to change the venue of the detention 
proceedings to a more convenient one (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 142). 
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 Article 6: In Jordan v. the United Kingdom, criminal proceedings against the applicant were 
stayed on health grounds, providing, inter alia, that he did not engage in any activities 
either political, social or personal, which would demonstrate that he was in fact able to 
stand trial irrespective of his medical condition. The Court examined whether this 
condition was an instance of a prohibition on political activity “in return” for the dropping 
of criminal charges. 
 Article 11: In The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria 
(no. 2), the Court examined whether a refusal to register the applicant party sought to 
penalise it on account of the views or policies it promoted (§§ 85-89). 
 Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11: In Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, the Court 
examined whether the refusal to allow a protest march against homophobia was 
influenced by the mayor's publicly expressed homophobic opinions (§§ 97 and 100). 
E.  When to apply Article 18 
15.  The mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the 
requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. 
Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a 
restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a 
fundamental aspect of the case (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 291). 
16.  The Court has never raised the issue of the application of Article 18 ex officio. However, it has 
examined complaints under Article 18 raised in substance (Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 104). 
III.  The purpose of restrictions 
17.  When considering an allegation under Article 18 the Court must establish: 
 whether the restriction of the applicant’s right or freedom was applied for an ulterior 
purpose; 
 whether the restriction pursued both a purpose prescribed by the Convention and an 
ulterior one, that is, whether there was a plurality of purposes; 
 which purpose was predominant (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 309). 
18.  Where the restriction of a Convention right amounts to a continuing situation, the Court will 
assess what purpose(s) it pursued throughout the whole period of its duration. In particular, it will 
ascertain whether, at a given moment during the course of the application of the impugned 
restriction, an ulterior purpose has supplanted the prescribed one or become predominant 
(Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 308 and 351). 
A.  The notion of “ulterior purpose” 
19.  An ulterior purpose is a purpose which is not prescribed by the relevant provision of the 
Convention and which is different from that proclaimed by the authorities (or the one which can be 
reasonably inferred from the context) (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 292; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 
§ 255; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 106; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 294; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev 
v. Russia, § 899; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 153; 
Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 113). 
20.  The notion of ulterior purpose is related to that of “bad faith”, but they are not necessarily 
equivalent in each case (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 283). 
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21.  The Court has distanced itself from its previous approach which consisted in applying a general 
rebuttable assumption that the national authorities of the High Contracting States have acted in 
good faith and in focusing its scrutiny on proof of bad faith (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 255; Lutsenko 
v. Ukraine, § 106; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 294; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 899; Ilgar 
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 137; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 153). Instead, it aims at an objective 
assessment of the presence or absence of an ulterior purpose, and thus of a misuse of power 
(Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 282-283). 
22.  The Court has examined allegations of the following ulterior purposes: 
 intimidation and putting pressure on the applicant with a view to obtaining information or 
other advantages (Gusinskiy v. Russia, § 76; Cebotari v. Moldova, § 53; Merabishvili 
v. Georgia [GC], § 353; Dochnal v. Poland, § 116 ); 
 punishing and silencing the applicant (Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.); Lutsenko 
v. Ukraine, § 109; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 299; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 143; 
Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 162); 
 political and/or economic motivation behind criminal prosecution and other relevant 
proceedings (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 254; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, 
§ 665; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 889; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), § 109; 
Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 332). 
B.  Restrictions applied solely for an ulterior purpose 
23.  Sometimes, a right or freedom is restricted solely for a purpose which is not prescribed by the 
Convention (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 292). 
24.  In the following cases, where the Court found a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with 
Article 5, the applicants’ detention pursued solely an ulterior purpose, as there had been either no 
valid grounds to detain them (Lutsenko v. Ukraine, §§ 63-65 and 67-72; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, 
§§ 269-271) or the charges against them were not based on a “reasonable suspicion”  within the 
meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) (Cebotari v. Moldova, § 52; Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 100; Rasul 
Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 133). 
25.  The case of Cebotari v. Moldova is closely linked to the case of Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova. In 
Cebotari v. Moldova, the applicant, in his capacity as the head of Moldtranselectro, a State-owned 
power distribution company, requested the Moldovan Ministry of Finance to issue a Treasury bond 
in favour of Oferta Plus, a private company which had paid for the electricity supplied from Ukraine 
to Moldtranselectro and consumed, inter alia, by State institutions. Subsequently, Oferta Plus 
brought successful proceedings against the Ministry of Finance for refusing to cash in the bond. After 
the Moldovan Government had been informed about the application lodged by Oferta Plus with the 
Court in respect of the non-enforcement of the final judgment in its favour, that judgment was 
quashed and criminal proceedings were initiated against its Chief Executive Officer and Mr Cebotari 
on charges of large-scale embezzlement of State property. The charges were based on the premise 
that Oferta Plus had not paid for the electricity supplied specifically to State institutions and thus 
had fraudulently obtained the Treasury bond. In Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova, the Court found a 
breach of Article 34 on the ground that the impugned criminal proceedings were aimed at 
discouraging the company from pursuing its application before the Court (§ 143). In Cebotari 
v. Moldova, having regard to the clear findings in the final judgments of the civil courts in the dispute 
between Oferta Plus and the Ministry of Finance, the Court held that the Government had failed to 
satisfy it that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence, with 
the result that there was no justification for his arrest and detention. The only aim of his pre-trial 
detention, therefore, was to put pressure on him with a view to hindering Oferta Plus from pursuing 
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its application before the Court. There had thus been a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with 
Article 5 § 1 (§§ 52-53). 
26.  In Lutsenko v. Ukraine, soon after a change of power, the applicant – a former Minister of the 
Interior and opposition leader – was charged with abuse of office. Shortly after a newspaper had 
published an interview in which he denied the accusations against him, he was remanded in pre-trial 
detention. His detention did not pursue any purpose prescribed by the Convention, as none of the 
grounds advanced by the authorities were found by the Court to be compatible with the 
requirements of Article 5 § 1 (§§ 66-74). In addition, the fact that the applicant’s communication 
with the media was explicitly indicated as one of such grounds clearly demonstrated an attempt by 
the authorities to punish him for publicly disputing the charges against him, which qualified as an 
ulterior purpose contrary to Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 (§§ 108-110). 
27.  The case of Tymoshenko v. Ukraine also concerned criminal prosecution of an opposition leader 
and a former Prime Minister, who was charged with excess of authority and abuse of office soon 
after a change of power. The Court likewise found a breach of Article 5 § 1 taken alone, as the 
applicant’s pre-trial detention did not pursue any of the purposes envisaged by that provision. In 
addition, the factual context and the reasons given by the domestic authorities suggested that the 
main justification for the applicant’s detention was in fact her supposed hindering of the 
proceedings and contemptuous behaviour. For the Court, her detention therefore pursued solely an 
ulterior purpose, namely punishing her for her conduct during the impugned trial, in violation of 
Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 (§§ 299-301). 
28.  In Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, the applicant, an opposition politician critical of the 
Government, published on his Internet blog his first-hand account of a local riot, which had 
spontaneously started a day before he arrived on site. His blog posts, which were immediately 
picked up by the press, contradicted the Government’s version of the events and contained sourced 
information which the Government had reportedly attempted to withhold from the public. On the 
following day the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a joint press 
statement accusing the applicant of acting illegally with a view to inflaming the situation in the 
country. Several days later, after being questioned, the applicant was charged with organising the 
riot and remanded in custody. The Court found a breach of Article 5 § 1 taken alone, since the 
prosecution had failed to produce, either before the domestic courts or otherwise, any objective 
information or evidence giving rise to a “reasonable suspicion” against the applicant. The Court 
further inferred from the above circumstances that his detention was linked to his blog posts and 
thus pursued only the ulterior purpose of silencing and punishing him for criticising the Government 
and attempting to disseminate the information the Government were trying to hide. The detention 
thus constituted a breach of Article 18 (§§ 142-143). 
29.  In Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, the applicant, a prominent human rights activist in Azerbaijan, 
was charged with serious offences “whose core constituent elements could not reasonably be found 
on the existing facts” (§ 156). He had thus been placed in pre-trial detention in the absence of a 
“reasonable suspicion”, in violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) taken alone. Against the background of an 
ongoing campaign to crack down on human rights defenders in Azerbaijan which had intensified at 
the material time, the Court found a breach of Article 18 as the applicant’s arrest and detention 
pursued solely the ulterior purpose of silencing and punishing him for his activities in the area of 
human rights (§§ 159-163). 
C.  Restrictions pursuing a plurality of purposes 
30.  It is equally possible that a restriction is applied both for an ulterior purpose and a purpose 
prescribed by the Convention; in other words, that it pursues a plurality of purposes (Merabishvili 
v. Georgia [GC], § 292). 
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1.  General principles 
31.  Any public policy or individual measure may have a “hidden agenda” (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, 
§ 255; Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 106; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 294). Where it is established that a 
restriction pursues a plurality of purposes, the mere presence of a purpose which does not fall 
within the respective restriction clause cannot of itself give rise to a breach of Article 18. On the 
other hand, a finding that the restriction pursues a purpose prescribed by the Convention does not 
necessarily rule out a breach of Article 18 either. The prescribed purpose does not invariably 
expunge the ulterior one (Merabishvili v. Georgia, §§ 303-304). 
32.  Where a restriction pursues an ulterior purpose and a purpose prescribed by the Convention, 
the Court will determine which is predominant. A predominant purpose in this context is the one 
that truly actuated the authorities and which was the overriding focus of their efforts (Merabishvili 
v. Georgia [GC], § 303). 
33.  A restriction can be compatible with the substantive Convention provision which authorises it 
because it pursues an aim permissible under that provision, but still infringe Article 18 because the 
prescribed purpose, while present, was in reality simply a cover enabling the authorities to attain an 
extraneous purpose, which was the overriding focus of their efforts (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 
§ 305). In other words, if it is established that a restriction also pursued an ulterior purpose, there 
will only be a breach of Article 18 if the ulterior purpose is predominant (ibid., § 318). 
34.  Conversely, if the prescribed purpose was the main purpose, the one that truly actuated the 
authorities, though they also wanted to gain some other advantage, the restriction does not run 
counter to Article 18 (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 305). 
35.  Which purpose is predominant in a given case depends on all the circumstances. In assessing 
that point, the Court will have regard to the nature and degree of reprehensibility of the alleged 
ulterior purpose, and bear in mind that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the 
ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], 
§ 307). 
36.  Where the restriction of a Convention right amounts to a continuing situation, in order for it not 
to contravene Article 18, its chief purpose must remain the purpose prescribed by the Convention 
throughout its duration, and it cannot be excluded that the initial purpose will be supplanted by 
another as time goes by. The assessment of which purpose was predominant may thus vary over 
time (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 308 and 351). 
37.  When examining allegations of several ulterior purposes, the Court will assess whether an 
ulterior purpose was predominant with respect to each of the purposes cited by the applicant 
(Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 319). In some cases, the Court has focused its scrutiny on 
distinguishable case features allowing it to look into the matter separately from allegations of 
politically motivated prosecution (Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 108; Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 298; Ilgar 
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 140; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 155). 
2.  Examples 
38.  In the following cases, the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 § 1, 
on the grounds that the applicants’ detention, while pursuing the purpose of bringing them before a 
competent legal authority, as prescribed by Article 5 § 1 (c), was chiefly meant for another purpose 
not prescribed by the Convention. 
39.  In Gusinskiy v. Russia (§§ 73-78), the applicant was a former chairman and majority shareholder 
of a private media holding company, Media Most, which had been involved in a bitter dispute over 
its debts with Gazprom, a natural gas monopoly controlled by the State. The applicant was arrested 
and imprisoned on suspicion of fraud. While he was in detention, the acting Minister for Press and 
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Mass Communications offered to drop the charges against him if he sold his media company to 
Gazprom, at a price to be determined by Gazprom. An agreement was signed by the parties and 
endorsed by the Acting Minister. A few days later, the investigator stayed the prosecution on the 
grounds that the applicant had significantly compensated for the harm caused to the interests of the 
State by voluntarily transferring Media Most shares to a legal entity controlled by the State. For the 
Court, the evidence gathered by the investigating authorities could “satisfy an objective observer” 
that the applicant might have committed the fraud offence; however, the facts strongly suggested 
that his prosecution had in fact been “used as part of commercial bargaining strategies”. The 
predominant purpose for his detention was therefore not to bring him before a competent legal 
authority, but to intimidate him into selling his company. There had thus been a breach of Article 18 
(§ 76). 
40.  In Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], shortly after a change of power, the applicant – a former Prime-
Minister and the leader of the main opposition party – was placed in pre-trial detention on charges 
of embezzlement, abuse of authority and other offences. One night during his pre-trial detention, he 
was covertly removed from his cell to be questioned by the Chief Prosecutor about the death of 
another former Prime Minister and about the financial activities of the former President, 
Mr Saakashvili. The Court found that nothing in the incriminating material appeared to cast doubt on 
the reasonableness of the suspicion against the applicant. His pre-trial detention was lawful and 
pursued a purpose consistent with Article 5 § 1 (c) (§§ 187, 206 and 208). However, as the pre-trial 
detention constituted a continuing situation, the Court was called to assess what purposes it 
pursued throughout the whole period of its duration and which one was predominant. There was no 
evidence that until the applicant’s removal from his cell for questioning, that is, for a period of 
nearly seven months, the authorities had pursued any ulterior purpose. That incident revealed, 
however, that the authorities had attempted to use his pre-trial detention as a means to pressure 
him into providing information and that, at the material time, his detention thus pursued an ulterior 
purpose alongside the prescribed one. At the same time, the reasons for keeping him in pre-trial 
detention appeared to have already receded for some time before the incident, which led the Court 
to find a breach of Article 5 § 3. Having regard to all the circumstances of the impugned incident, the 
Court was satisfied that the predominant purpose of the applicant’s detention had changed from the 
initial, prescribed purpose of investigating offences on the basis of reasonable suspicion to the 
subsequent, ulterior purpose of obtaining information from the applicant. There had therefore been 
a violation of Article 18 read in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 (§ 353). 
41.  In the following cases the Court did not exclude the possibility that the authorities had pursued 
an ulterior purpose, but was unable to find that such purpose was predominant. 
42.  In Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], the Court also examined the allegation that the applicant’s arrest 
and pre-trial detention were meant to remove him from the political scene. Having regard to the 
broader political context, in particular, the bitter antagonism between the applicant’s opposition 
party and the ruling party, the timing of his detention and the nature of the offences with which he 
had been charged, the Court found it understandable that there was a degree of suspicion of a 
political impetus behind the charges, even though the charges themselves were not overtly political. 
However, having examined the manner in which the criminal proceedings had been conducted, the 
Court was not satisfied that the predominant purpose of the applicant’s detention was to hinder his 
participation in politics rather than to ensure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings against 
him (§§ 320-332). 
43.  In Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, the applicants, who were wealthy businessmen and 
senior managers of the Yukos oil company, were prosecuted on charges of fraud and tax evasion. 
They maintained that their prosecution was driven by political motives. Having regard to the 
applicants’ political status and other circumstances surrounding the case, the Court was prepared to 
accept that some political groups or government officials had had their own reasons to push for the 
applicants’ prosecution. It did not exclude the possibility that in limiting some of the applicants’ 
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rights throughout the proceedings some of the authorities or State officials might have had a 
“hidden agenda”. However, the Court could not agree with the applicants’ “sweeping claim that 
their whole case was a travesty of justice”. Possible elements of “improper motivation” or a “mixed 
intent” behind the applicants’ prosecution were insufficient to conclude that they would not have 
been convicted otherwise. The Court therefore found no breach of Article 18 as the alleged ulterior 
purpose was not predominant (§§ 906-908). 
IV.  Issues of proof and evidence 
A.  General evidentiary standards 
44.  When deciding a case under Article 18, the Court no longer applies the general presumption of 
good faith on the part of national authorities or any special rules with regard to proof (contrast 
Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, §§ 255-256 and 260; and Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 899). 
Instead, it adheres to its usual approach to proof (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 310). 
45.  The first aspect of that approach is that, as a general rule, the burden of proof is not borne by 
one or other party because the Court examines all the material before it irrespective of its origin, 
and can obtain material of its own motion. On a number of occasions, the Court has recognised that 
strictly following the approach whereby the burden of proof in relation to an allegation lies on the 
party which makes it is not possible, notably in instances where the applicants face specific 
evidentiary difficulties (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 311; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, §§ 160-
161; Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], §§ 112-113 and 115; Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], §§ 93 and 95). 
46.  The Court relies on the evidence which the parties adduce spontaneously, although it can of its 
own motion ask applicants or respondent Governments to provide material which can corroborate 
or refute the allegations made before it. If the respondent Government in question do not accede to 
such a request, the Court can draw inferences if they do not duly account for their failure or refusal 
(Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], § 202). Rule 44C § 1 of the Rules of Court allows it also to 
combine such inferences with contextual factors (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 312). 
47.  The possibility for the Court to draw inferences from the respondent Government’s conduct in 
the proceedings before it, especially in situations where the State alone has access to information 
capable of corroborating or refuting the applicant’s allegations, is of particular relevance in relation 
to allegations of ulterior purpose (see, among other authorities, Timurtaş v. Turkey, § 66; Aktaş 
v. Turkey, § 272; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], § 152; Merabishvili 
v. Georgia [GC], § 313). 
48.  The second aspect of the Court’s approach is that the standard of proof before it is “beyond 
reasonable doubt”. That standard is not co-extensive with that of the national legal systems which 
employ it. First, such proof can follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and 
concordant inferences or similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Secondly, the level of persuasion 
required to reach a conclusion is intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the 
allegation made and the Convention right at stake (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 314). 
49.  The third aspect of the Court’s approach is that the Court is free to assess not only the 
admissibility and relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it. When 
assessing evidence it is not bound by formulae and adopts the conclusions supported by the free 
evaluation of all the evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ 
submissions (Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], § 147). It is sensitive to any potential evidentiary 
difficulties encountered by a party (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 315). 
European Court of Human Rights  13/23 
Guide on Article 18 of the Convention – Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
50.  The Court will not restrict itself to direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18 or apply 
a special standard of proof to such allegations (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 282 and 310; 
contrast Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 260; Dochnal v. Poland, § 116; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), § 109; 
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, § 603; Bîrsan v. Romania (dec.), § 73; Khodorkovskiy 
and Lebedev v. Russia, § 899). 
51.  Finally, circumstantial evidence in this context means information about the primary facts, or 
contextual facts or sequences of events which can form the basis for inferences about the primary 
facts (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 142; Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, § 158). Reports or 
statements by international observers, non-governmental organisations or the media, or the 
decisions of other national or international courts are often taken into account, in particular, to shed 
light on the facts, or to corroborate findings made by the Court (Baka v. Hungary [GC], § 148; 
Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 317). 
52.  When it comes to allegations of ulterior purpose in the context of criminal prosecution, it is hard 
to divorce the pre-trial detention from the criminal proceedings (Lutsenko v. Ukraine, § 108; 
Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, § 298; Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 114). Where an allegation is made under 
Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, the Court focuses its scrutiny on the court decisions ordering 
and/or extending pre-trial detention. It can also take into account the manner in which the 
impugned criminal proceedings were conducted (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 320 and 325). 
B.  Allegations of political purposes 
53.  When examining allegations of political purposes in the context of criminal prosecution, the 
Court has regard to the following factors: 
 the broader political context in which the criminal case was brought against the applicant 
(Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 322; Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 257; Khodorkovskiy and 
Lebedev v. Russia, § 901; Nastase v. Romania (dec.), § 107); 
 whether the prosecution and judicial authorities themselves were driven by ulterior 
motives (Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 323); 
 whether there is evidence that the courts were not sufficiently independent from the 
executive authorities (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 324); 
 the manner in which the criminal proceedings were conducted (Merabishvili v. Georgia 
[GC], § 325); 
 whether the charges against the applicant were genuine and amounted to a “reasonable 
suspicion” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 258; 
Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 908; Dochnal v. Poland, § 111; Merabishvili 
v. Georgia [GC], § 318); 
 whether the charges against the applicant concerned his/her political activities or common 
criminal-law offences (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 906; Merabishvili v. Georgia 
[GC], §320); 
 whether domestic judicial decisions were well-reasoned and based on the relevant 
provisions of domestic law (Nastase v. Romania (dec.), § 107). 
54.  The fact that a suspect’s political opponents or business competitors might directly or indirectly 
benefit from his/her conviction should not prevent the authorities from prosecuting such a person if 
there are genuine charges against him/her. In other words, high political status does not grant 
immunity (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 258; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 903). 
55.  Although criminal prosecutions initiated against politicians and high-ranking officials after a 
change of power could suggest a wish to eliminate or harm them or their political parties, they could 
equally reflect a desire to deal with alleged wrongdoings under a previous government whose 
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members could not be held to account while in power (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 323; 
Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 903). The mere fact that a politician is criminally prosecuted, 
even during an electoral campaign, is not automatically in breach of his or her right to run for office 
(Uspaskich v. Lithuania, §§ 90-100). There is no right as such under the Convention not to be 
criminally prosecuted (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 320). 
56.  Statements by politicians and government officials can only be seen as proof of an ulterior 
purpose behind a judicial decision if there is evidence that the courts were not sufficiently 
independent from the executive authorities (Tchankotadze v. Georgia, § 114; Merabishvili v. Georgia 
[GC], § 324). 
57.  Domestic judgments refusing extradition do not necessarily determine the Court’s assessment 
of the existence of political motivation behind criminal prosecution, as the extradition courts in 
essence assess a future risk, whereas the Court is concerned with past facts; that colours their 
respective assessment of inconclusive contextual evidence (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], § 330). 
C.  Evidence leading to a finding of a breach of Article 18 
1.  Direct evidence 
58.  In the following cases, the Court based its findings of a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with 
Article 5 on direct written evidence of an ulterior purpose. 
59.  In Gusinskiy v. Russia, the applicant, a wealthy businessman, was charged and placed in pre-trial 
detention in order to pressurise him into selling his media company to a State-owned company. 
Direct proof flowed from a written agreement, endorsed by a government minister, linking the 
dropping of the charges against the applicant to the sale of the company, and from the terms of the 
decision discontinuing the criminal proceedings against him, which referred to that agreement; the 
respondent Government had not sought to deny that link (§§ 73-78). 
60.  In Lutsenko v. Ukraine, the Court relied on the arguments in the investigator’s request to place 
the applicant in pre-trial detention that, by talking to the media, he was trying to distort public 
opinion, discredit the prosecuting authorities and influence his upcoming trial. For the Court, that 
showed that the detention was aimed at punishing the applicant for publicly asserting his innocence 
(§§ 26 and 108-109). 
61.  In Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, the Court relied on the statements in the prosecution’s request to 
place the applicant in pre-trial detention and in the corresponding court order which showed that 
the purpose had been to punish her for disrespect towards the court and perceived obstructive 
conduct during hearings (§§ 30-31 and 299). 
2.  Circumstantial evidence 
62.  In the following cases the Court found a breach of Article 18, basing itself on contextual 
evidence of ulterior purpose. 
63.  In Cebotari v. Moldova, the Court found that the head of a State-owned company had been 
placed in pre-trial detention on fabricated charges in order to put pressure on him with a view to 
hindering a private company, Oferta Plus, with which he was linked from pursuing its application to 
the Court. The Court based that finding on the fact that the materials in the case could not lead an 
objective observer reasonably to believe that the applicant could have committed the offence in 
relation to which he had been detained. The Court was also influenced by the context of the case 
(§§ 50-53), in particular, 
 its findings in the case of Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova regarding the breach of the 
company’s right of petition (§§ 137-43); 
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 the fact that the charges against the applicant were indissociable from those against the 
Chief Executive Officer of Oferta Plus and that they were closely connected with the 
subject matter of the application of Oferta Plus to the Court (Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova, 
§ 137); 
 the fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant and Oferta Plus's Chief 
Executive Officer and their detention coincided in time, were initiated and dealt with by 
the same investigators and couched in similar terms; 
 the fact that the charges were brought for the first time after the Moldovan Government 
had been informed about of Oferta Plus’s application to the Court and that those charges, 
which were discontinued in the meantime, were reactivated shortly after the 
communication of the case to the Government (Oferta Plus S.R.L. v. Moldova, § 142). 
64.  In Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan and Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, proof of an ulterior purpose – 
to silence or punish the applicant in the first case for criticising the authorities and spreading 
information they were trying to suppress, and the applicant in the second case for his human-rights 
activities – derived from a juxtaposition of the lack of “reasonable suspicion” within the meaning of 
Article 5 § 1 (c) with a combination of relevant case-specific facts. In the first case, these were a close 
chronological correlation between the applicant’s blog entries, the authorities’ public statement 
denouncing them, the charges, and the arrest (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, §§ 141-143). In the 
second case, they were the increasingly harsh regulation of non-governmental organisations and 
their funding in Azerbaijan, allegations by high-ranking officials and the pro-government media that 
activists such as the applicant were foreign agents and traitors, and the contemporaneous detention 
and criminal prosecution of other such activists (Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, §§ 156-162). 
65.  In Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], the Court found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with 
Article 5 § 1 because, during the course of the applicant’s pre-trial detention, its predominant 
purpose had changed from one that was Convention compliant to the ulterior purpose of pressuring 
him into providing information. This was shown by the incident of his covert removal from his cell to 
be questioned by the Chief Prosecutor about the death of a former Prime Minister and about the 
financial activities of the former President.  
66.  Some of the factors which led the Court to that conclusion related to the time of the incident: 
the reasons for keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention appeared to have receded; the former 
President, who had become the target of several criminal investigations, had just left Georgia 
following the end of his term of office; the investigation into the former Prime Minister’s death had 
apparently not made significant progress. 
67.  Other factors showed the considerable importance of the questions regarding the two men for 
the authorities. Thus, the Government had stated at the hearing before the Grand Chamber that 
there was still a “huge question” for the applicant to answer on this point. The prosecuting 
authorities had had the power to drop all the charges against the applicant at any point without 
judicial control and had promised to do so if he provided the requested information, so the courts 
would have had to discontinue the criminal proceedings against him. The applicant had been taken 
in a covert and apparently irregular manner, in a clandestine operation carried out in the middle of 
the night, to meet with an individual who had been appointed to his post three weeks previously. 
The authorities’ initial reaction in that respect had been to issue firm denials, and the ensuing 
inquiry and investigation had been marred by a series of omissions from which it could be inferred 
that the authorities had been eager that the matter should not come to light: the main protagonists 
had not been interviewed during the initial inquiry but only some three years after the events, and 
the crucial evidence in the case – the footage from the prison surveillance cameras – had not been 
recovered (Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], §§ 352-353). 
European Court of Human Rights  16/23 
Guide on Article 18 of the Convention – Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
D.  Unsubstantiated complaints 
68.  In the following cases, the Court was not satisfied there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 
the State authorities had pursued purposes other than those prescribed in the Convention, or that 
such purposes had been predominant. 
69.  In Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], the Court was unable to find that the alleged ulterior purpose of 
removing the applicant from the political scene was the predominant purpose of his pre-trial 
detention. The Court had regard to the broader political context of the case, as well as the manner in 
which the criminal proceedings had been conducted. Firstly, the prosecution of various high officials 
from the applicant’s political party and related statements by the Government officials could not in 
themselves lead to the conclusion that the courts deciding on the applicant’s pre-trial detention had 
been driven by a political purpose, absent evidence that the courts were not sufficiently 
independent from the executive (§ 324). Secondly, the duration of the trial had not been 
unreasonably long, and the place of the proceedings (outside the capital) was not redolent of forum 
shopping. Thirdly, the shortcomings in the court decisions from the point of view of Article 5 § 3 
were not in themselves proof of a political purpose. Fourthly, the fact that courts of other member 
States had turned down requests for the extradition of other former officials from the applicant’s 
party on grounds that the criminal prosecutions against them were politically motivated did not 
necessarily determine the Court’s assessment of that point. The facts of those cases had not been 
identical. Moreover, the extradition courts had been assessing a future risk, whereas the Court was 
concerned with past facts (§§ 322-332). 
70.  In Kamma v. the Netherlands, Commission’s report, the applicant had been detained on 
extortion charges and the police had used his period in custody to question him about his alleged 
involvement in a murder. The Commission found no breach of Article 18, considering that the police 
had been entitled to proceed as they had, and that the detention had not prejudiced the applicant’s 
position in the murder case (pp. 10-12). 
71.  In Ramishvili and Kokhreidze v. Georgia (dec.), the applicants, who were the co-founders and 
shareholders of a television channel, were remanded in custody on charges of extortion for 
demanding payment in exchange for not disclosing an embarrassing documentary about an allegedly 
corrupt parliamentarian. The Court was unable to find that their detention pursued, as claimed, the 
ulterior purpose of silencing their television channel and putting an end to their critical journalistic 
opinions in order to save the reputation of the parliamentarian concerned and that of the ruling 
party. Apart from referring to the general human-rights problems in Georgia, the applicants did not 
point to specific facts in their particular case supporting the allegation of an ulterior purpose. On the 
other hand, the Court took note of a number of factors pointing to the absence of the alleged 
ulterior purpose. In particular, the charges against the applicants did not concern their journalistic 
activities. Unlike the position in Gusinskiy v. Russia, the Government had not offered them any kind 
of bargain in exchange for discontinuing the criminal proceedings. Their channel continued to 
broadcast and the controversial documentary was aired even after they had been detained. 
Moreover, the Georgian Parliament had conducted its own investigation into the parliamentarian’s 
commercial activities, after which he resigned. The applicants’ complaint under Article 18 in 
conjunction with Article 5 was therefore rejected as unsubstantiated. 
72.  In Dochnal v. Poland, the applicant, a businessman and lobbyist, was placed in pre-trial 
detention on charges of tax evasion, money-laundering and offering a bribe to a Member of 
Parliament. These charges amounted to a “reasonable suspicion” and his detention therefore 
pursued a purpose prescribed by Article 5 § 1 (c). The Court acknowledged that his case might raise a 
certain degree of suspicion as to whether the real intent of the authorities was to extract further 
depositions from him regarding various sensitive political matters. However, the applicant’s 
submissions in respect of an alleged ulterior purpose were limited to an assertion that the 
authorities had kept him in detention in order to persecute and abuse him. His complaint under 
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Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 was therefore rejected as manifestly ill-founded (§§ 115-
116). 
73.  In Nastase v. Romania (dec.), the applicant, a former Prime Minister and chairman of a political 
party, alleged that his conviction of a number of corruption offences was politically motivated. To 
support his claim, he pointed to the statements in the judgment that he “personified the corruption 
of political class” and that an “exemplary sentence” of imprisonment was thus called for (§§ 34 and 
106). For the Court, however, such statements were the consequence of the domestic court’s finding 
in respect of his criminal liability rather than the expression of an ulterior motive. Moreover, the 
domestic court judgments were well-reasoned and based on the relevant provisions of domestic 
law. Even though the applicant’s high political status might give rise to a certain suspicion as to the 
authorities’ real interest in his conviction, his allegations in this respect were quite vague and did not 
refer to any concrete evidence of misuse of power. The Court therefore rejected as manifestly ill-
founded the applicant’s complaint under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 (§§ 108-109). 
74.  In Tchankotadze v. Georgia, the applicant, a high-ranking civil servant, was prosecuted for abuse 
of power and remanded in custody, shortly after Mr Saakashvili was elected President of Georgia. 
During his presidential election campaign, the latter publicly threatened that the applicant would be 
“jailed”. The Court rejected as manifestly ill-founded the applicant’s complaint under Article 18 in 
conjunction with Article 5 as the impugned threat was insufficient to find an ulterior purpose behind 
his prosecution and related pre-trial detention. The Court was unable, in the absence of any other 
additional evidence or arguments, to establish that the initiation of the criminal case was necessarily 
linked to that threat, or that President Saakashvili had in any other manner unduly influenced the 
unfolding of the case. Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that the prosecution or judicial 
authorities themselves had shown, either through official or unofficial channels, the existence of any 
ulterior motives (§§ 114-115). 
75.  The cases of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Khodorkovskiy v. Russia and 
Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia were brought respectively by one of the biggest Russian oil 
producers and its senior managers and major shareholders, who were among the richest men in 
Russia. Mr Khodorkovskiy was also politically active: he allocated significant funds to support 
opposition parties. Both managers were detained and subsequently convicted of tax evasion and 
fraud. During the same period, tax and enforcement proceedings were brought against the Yukos 
company, which was put into liquidation. Its demise resulted from the uncompromising execution of 
tax debts and disproportionate bailiffs’ fees. 
76.  The Court accepted that the circumstances surrounding these cases could be interpreted as 
supporting the applicants’ claim of improper motives: the authorities were trying to reduce the 
political influence of “oligarchs” and Yukos’s business projects ran counter to the petroleum policy of 
the State, which was one of the main beneficiaries of its dismantlement (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev 
v. Russia, § 910; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, §§ 237-238). Nevertheless, the Court 
was not satisfied that the impugned proceedings chiefly pursued, as claimed, the ulterior purpose of 
removing Mr Khodorkovskiy from the political scene and enabling the State to appropriate the 
assets of Yukos (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 260; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, § 665; 
Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 908). 
77.  The applicants relied on contextual evidence and authoritative opinions by political institutions, 
non-governmental organisations or public figures to support their allegations under Article 18. The 
Court held that they had failed to produce “incontrovertible and direct proof” (Khodorkovskiy 
v. Russia, § 260; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, § 663; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev 
v. Russia, § 902). However, in Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], the Court clarified that it does not restrict 
itself to direct proof in relation to such complaints and that the burden of proof is not borne by one 
or the other party (§§ 311 and 316). These cases are therefore to be read in light of this clarification. 
The Court also relied on the following arguments. 
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78.  First, the authorities’ perception of Mr Khodorkovskiy as a serious political opponent and the 
benefit accruing to a State-owned company as a result of Yukos’s demise were not enough to 
establish a breach of Article 18 because the criminal prosecution of anyone with such a high profile 
would benefit his opponents. Moreover, this consideration should not prevent the authorities from 
prosecuting such a person if there are serious charges against him: “high political status does not 
grant immunity” (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, §§ 257-58; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 903). 
79.  Second, the charges against the Yukos managers had been genuine and serious, their criminal 
case had a “healthy core” (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 258; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 
§ 908). The authorities had also legitimately acted to counter tax evasion by Yukos (OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, § 664). The Court rejected the company’s claim that its debt had been 
recognised as a result of an unforeseeable, unlawful and arbitrary interpretation of domestic law 
(ibid., §§ 605, 616 and 664).  
80.  Third, none of the accusations against the Yukos managers concerned their political activities – 
they had been prosecuted for common criminal offences (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 
§ 906). 
81.  Finally, the rulings of courts which had refused to extradite the applicants’ associates to Russia, 
or had denied legal assistance to, issued injunctions against, or made awards against the Russian 
authorities in Yukos-related cases, although a strong argument, were not sufficient because the 
evidence and arguments before those courts could have differed from those before the Court 
(Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 260; Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, § 900). 
82.  The Court was unable to establish the presence of the alleged ulterior purposes and found no 
breach of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 in Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, and in conjunction with 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia. In Khodorkovskiy and 
Lebedev v. Russia, the Court was prepared to accept that there was an ulterior purpose behind the 
applicants’ criminal prosecution. However, it found no breach of Article 18 as the alleged ulterior 
purpose was not proven to be predominant. 
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